Index of Articles, Notes and Reviews appearing in *Public Choice* from Volume XI to the present. (Note: An index of articles appearing in previous *Public Choice* volumes is found on page 119 of Volume X. Beginning with next year's Winter issue, a yearly index will be published).

Please note that each issue of *Public Choice* is numbered as a separate volume.

Prepared by Betty Hoover.

	_	_	_	_		
VOLUME XI		F	Al	LL	, 19	971
ARTICLES	P/	AG	E	U	MB.	ERS
Principles of Urban-Fiscal Strategy, James M. Buchanan						1
Multipart Pricing of Public Goods, Edward H. Clarke						17
Internal Processes Governing Party Positions in Elections, James S. Coleman						35
A Linear Programming Approach to the Economic Theory of Elec J. Ronnie Davis and Louis H. Zincone, Jr						61
Social Welfare and Electoral Competition in Democratic Societies Melvin J. Hinich and Peter C. Ordeshook						73
The Paradox of Revolution, Gordon Tullock						89
Why Do High Income People Participate More in Politics? Bruno S. Frey						101
A Note on Administrative Behavior and Public Policy, James L. Weatherby, Jr				•		107
Ireland, Thomas R., and Johnson, David B. The Economics of Cl by Burton R. Weisbrod		-				111
Bish, Robert L. The Public Economy of Metropolitan Areas, by Harold M. Hockman	*					116
Hirschman, Albert O. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Response to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States, by Joe R. Hulett						118
Hirsch, Werner Z. The Economics of State and Local Government by Richard E. Wagner	ıt,					119
Briefly Noted						10

PUBLIC CHOICE

VOLUME XII	S	PR	IL	VG	, 1	97	12
ARTICLES	PA	AG	E	NU	MI	BE	RS
Choice, Faith, and Politics: The Political Economy of Hutterian Communes, John Baden and Richard Stroup The Choice of Monetary Instruments and the Theory of Bureau							1
John F. Chant and Keith Acheson							13
Thomas R. Ireland							35
Morton I. Kamien and Nancy L. Schwartz							43
Dennis C. Mueller, Robert Tollison, and Thomas D. Willet A Social Choice Model of the California Feather River Project,				* *			57
Norman Plotkin							69
William P. Yohe NOTES							89
A Note on Cyclical Majorities, Edgar K. Browning						1	111
Bernard Grofman						1	13
Joseph P. Newhouse						1	115
Niskanen, William A. Bureaucracy and Representative Government Reviewed by Gordon Tullock	Case Soc	fo	y.				119
Reviewed by James M. Buchanan						1	125
VOLUME XIII			FA	L	L,	19	72
ARTICLES	1	PA	GE	N	UN	/B	ERS
Benevolence, Malevolence and Economic Theory, George Daly and Fred Giertz							1
Consensus or Conflict: Alternative Strategies for the Bureaucrae Bargainer, David Howard Davis							21
An Economic Approach to Riot Analysis, J. Patrick Guming							31
On Division of the Question, Joseph B. Kadane							47

The Social Gains from Exchanging Voters: A Simulation Approach, Dennis C. Mueller, Geoffrey C. Philpotts, and Jaroslav	
Vanek	55
Serving the Elderly?-An Illustration of the Niskanen Effect,	
Richard S. Sterne, Alvin Rabushka, and Helen A. Scott	81
Economic Competition and Political Competition,	
George J. Stigler	91
NOTES	
Manuscripts in the Maelstrom: A Theory of the Editorial Process,	
Alice Vandermeulen	07
COMMUNICATIONS	
Political Participation and Income Level: An Exchange,	
Keith P. Russell	13
John Fraser	15
Reply, Bruno S. Frey	19
REVIEW ARTICLE	
Rawls on Justice as Fairness,	
James M. Buchanan	23
REVIEWS	
Ostrom, Vincent. The Political Theory of a Compound Republic. Reviewed by William C. Havard	20
Davis, Lance E. and North, Douglass C. Institutional Change in	27
American Economic Growth. Reviewed by Gordon Tullock	31
Harris, Ralph and Seldon, Arthur. Choice in Welfare: Third Report	
on Knowledge and Preference in Education, Health Services and	
Pensions. Reviewed by William A. Riker	32
Dickinson, Frank G. The Changing Position of Philanthropy in the	
American Economy. Reviewed by David B. Johnson	35
Rowley, C. K. Steel and Public Policy.	
Reviewed by Marilyn R. Flowers	138
Tullock, Gordon. Private Wants Public Means.	
Reviewed by T. Nicolaus Tideman	138
Cross, John G. The Economics of Bargaining.	
Reviewed by George Daly	140

Barkley, Paul W. and Seckler, David W. Economic Growth and Environmental Decay: The Solution	n R	leci	om	99		
The Problem. Reviewed by John C. Moorhouse						.142
Pattanaik, Prasanta K. Voting and Collective Choice; and, Sen, Amartya. Collective Choice and Social Welfare. Reviewed by Jon Sonstelie						.145
VOLUME XIV	S	SPI	RII	NG	, 1	973
ARTICLES	P	AG	E	NU	MB	ERS
Collective Goods and Collective Decision Mechanisms, *Richard Auster and Morris Silver						. 1
The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, *Robert J. Barro**						. 19
Pareto Desirable Redistribution: The Non-Altruistic Dimension, Geoffrey Brennan						. 43
The Institutional Structure of Externality, James M. Buchanan						. 69
On the Incentives of Regulators: The Case of Taxicabs, Ross D. Eckert						. 83
A Diagrammatic Exposition of an Economic Theory of Imperial Paul Craig Roberts and Alvin Rabushka						101
Notes						
A Note on Revenue Sharing and the Theory of Public Expenditu						109
Welfare Effects of Announcing Election Forecasts, Kenneth M. Brown and Charles E. Zech						117
Poll Positions and Win Probabilities: A Stochastic Model of the Electoral Process, Jerry F. Medler and Donald S. Tull .						125
The Appeal of Minimum Wage Laws and the Invisible Hand in						13

Cheating and Control, Charles Nichols and Donald Whittmean 137	,
Review Article	
The Public Choice Theory of Murray N. Rothbard, A Modern Anarchist, H. E. Frech III	
Book Reviews	
Oates, Wallace E. Fiscal Federalism. Reviewed by Melville McMillan	5
Cobb, Roger W., and Elder, Charles D. Participation in American Politics: The Dynamic of Agenda-Building. Reviewed by	
Robert S. Ross	7
Eyestone, Robert. Political Economy. Reviewed by Paul R.	
Portney	0
Tullock, Gordon. The Logic of the Law. Reviewed by Eugene Swimmer	52
Editorial Note	66
European Public Choice Meeting	57
VOLUME XV SUMMER, 197	3
ARTICLES PAGE NUMBER	S
Indifference, Alientation and Rational Decisions: The Effects of Candidate Evaluations on Turnout and the Vote, Richard A. Brody and Benjamin I. Page	1
Stable Outcomes in Majority Voting Games, Judith Sloss	9
An Economic Approach to Social Choice, Trout Rader	9
Measuring Power in Voting Bodies, Harvey W. Kushner and Arnold B. Urken	7

Logrolling, Arrow Paradox and Cyclical Majorities,
Peter Bernholz
The Hunting of the Paradox,
Roger H. Marz, Thomas W. Casstevens, Harold T. Casstevens
The Paradox of Voting: An Elementary Solution
for the Case of Three Alternatives, Thomas J.
Hansen and Barry L. Prince
nansen and barry L. Prince
Communications, I. J. Good
VOLUME XVI FALL, 1973
ARTICLES PAGE NUMBER
T(C) and P in C in C
Efficiency in the Provision of Fire Services, Roger Ahlbrandt
Democratic Organization: A Prelimary Mathematical Model,
Raphael G. Kazmann
Normative Assumptions in the Study of Public Choice,
Duncan MacRae, Jr
AN
A Note on the Empirical Nature of the Taxpayer Rebellion, John L. Mikesell and John P. Blair
Is the Act of Voting Rational?
Yoram Barzel and Eugene Silberberg
Some Simple Economics of Voting and Not Voting, R. D. Tollison and T. D. Willett
R. D. Tollison and T. D. Willett
Notes
A Note on Collective Goods and the Theory of Political Entrepreneurship,
Jeffrey Richelson
The Rhodesian Constitution and Predictions for Political Stability,
Ewen Maclellan Wilson
Review Article
The Economic Theory of Politics: A Survey of German Contributions,
Bruno S. Frey and Rene L. Frey

Book Reviews

Telser, Lester. Competition, Collusion, and Game Theory. Reviewed by J. M. Buchanan and W. C. Bush	91
Forte, Francesco, and Mossetto, Gianfranco, eds. Economia del Benessere e Democrazia. Reviewed by Louis De Alessi	92
Tullock, Gordon, ed. Explorations in the Theory of Anarchy. Reviewed by Warren J. Samuels	94
VOLUME XVII SPRING, 197	4
ARTICLES PAGE NUMBER	S
On Money, Votes, and Policy in a Democratic Society, Uri Ben-Zion and Zeev Eytan	1
When to Join a Coalition, and With How Many Others Depends on What You Expect the Outcome to Be, Steven J. Brams and	
John C. Heilman	11
Toward a General Theoy of Managerial Discretion, Jean-Luc Migué and Gérard Bélanger	27
Comment, William A. Niskanen	43
Some Observations on the Political Economy of Property Tax Reform, Ralph E. Miner	49
Political Revolution and Repression: An Economic Approach, Morris Silver	63
A Description and Explanation of Citizen Participation in a Canadian Municipality, Mark Sproule-Jones	73
Notes	
Bargaining Costs and Social Choice Under Uncertainty, A. S. Pinto Barbosa	8:
Pareto Optimal Growth, John P. Blair and Walter Chatfield	9:
Hegel on the Calculus of Voting, James M. Buchanan	95
Economic Competition and Political Competition: Comments and Corrections, Noel M. Edelson	03

The Size Principle and Collective-Consumption Payoffs to Political Coalitions, Thomas S. McCaleb						107
Dynamic Consistency in Constitutions, John Yeabsley						111
Book Reviews						
Boulding, Kenneth. The Economy of Love and Fear: A Preface	to					
Grant Economics. Reviewed by Donald A. Wittman						115
Bernholz, Peter. Politische Okonomie.						
Reviewed by Bruno S. Frey	×	٠	*			118
Pauly, Mark V. Medical Care at Public Expense: A Study in						
Applied Welfare Economics. Reviewed by Richard N. Ros	ett					119
Goetz, Charles J. What is Revenue Sharing?						
Reviewed by Ray D. Whitman			٠			120
Posner, Richard A. Economic Analysis of Law.						
Reviewed by Gordon Tullock						122
Mushkin, Selma, ed. Public Prices for Public Products.						
Reviewed by David Marwick					٠	124
Kaufman, Herbert, in collaboration with Michael Couzens.						
Administrative Feedback: Monitoring Subordinates' Beha	vio	r.				
Reviewed by John Wanat		*				125
Wagner, Richard E. The Public Economy.						
Reviewed by George M. von Furstenberg					,	126
Goffman, Irving. Strategic Interaction.						
Reviewed by Oran R. Young						128
VOLUME XVIII	SU	JM	MI	ER	, 1	974
ARTICLES	E	0 1 1	20	NII	INA!	BERS
		710	31	140	/1411	DEICO
Game-Theoretic Models of Bloc-Voting under Proportional Representation: Really Sophisticated Voting in French						
Labor Elections, Howard Rosenthal						1
Artificial Markets and the Theory of Games,						
W. David Montgomery						25
Cycles of Risk, Richard McKelvey and Jeff Richelson						41

VOLUMES

VOLUMED					133
Voting Behavior and Aggregate Policy Targets, Susan J. Lepper					
Susan J. Lepper					. 67
On Social Restriction of Individual Freedom:					
Determination of an a priori Admissable Set of					
Individual Activities, Rubin Saposnik					. 83
The Calculus of Rational Choice, William C. Stratmann					. 93
Group Size, Group Homogeneity and the Aggregate					
Provision of a Pure Public Good under Cournot Behavior,					
Martin C. McGuire					. 107
Book Reviews					
Frohlich, Norman; Oppenheimer, Joe A.; and Young, Oran R. Political Leadership and Collective Goods. Reviewed					
by John Chamberlin					. 127
Coleman, James S. Power and the Structure of Society					
Reviewed by Gordon Tullock					. 130
VOLUME XIX	I	FA	LI	.,	1974
ARTICLES	AC	E	NI	IM	BERS
An Economic Analysis of Government Ownership and Regulation: Theory and the Evidence from the Electric Power Industry,					
Louis De Alessi	*				1
The Carrot and the Stick: Optimal Program Mixes for Entrepreneur Political Leaders, Norman Frohlich and Joe A. Oppenheimer	ial				43
A P. C. C. P. H. Ol. C. MI. M. C. C. P. C. C.					
An Experiment in Public Choice: The Miami Conservancy District, 1913-1922, J. Fred Giertz					63
The GPITPC and Institutional Entorpy,					
R. D. Auster				,	77
Local Government Policies and Migration: An Analysis for SMSA's	in				
the United States, Richard J. Cebula					. 85

Mixed Goods and Bads, Bruce Yandle

Notes

Fiscal Preference and Balanced Budget Fiscal Policy. . 107 Economic Theory of Democracy: An Empirical Test, Michael Boss The Fate of Solzhenitsyn: An Analytical Note, Pham Chung Transaction Costs, Uncertainty, and Externalities: A Note, Labor Intensity, Productivity, and the Growth of the Federal Sector, William Paul Orzechowski Dynamic Hypothesis on Bureaucracy, Gordon Tullock Vote Earning versus Vote Losing Properties of Minimum Wage Laws, More on Minimum Wage and Political Clout, Frank G. Steindl Book Reviews Howard, Nigel. Paradoxes of Rationality: Theory of Metagames and Roberts, Blaine and Holdren, Robert. Theory of Social Process: An Economic Analysis. Reviewed by Howard P. Tuckman Riker, William and Ordeshook, Peter. An Introduction to Positive Political Theory. Reviewed by John A. Ferejohn 144 Ostrom, Vincent. The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration, Reviewed by Bruce Buchanan Axelrod, Robert. Conflict of Interest. Reviewed by Robert L. Butterworth

VOLUME XX

WINTER, 1974

ARTICLES

PAGE NUMBERS

Models for the Optimal Allocation of Funds Over N Constituencies During an Election Campaign,

W. D. Cook and M. J. L. Kirby and S. L. Mehndiratta

VOL	

Monopolistic Trading Economies:											
A Case of Governmental Control,											
Amoz Kats	•	•									17
Single-Peakedness and Guttman Scales:											
Concept and Measurement,											
Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisber	g										33
A Model of Regulatory Agency Behavior, Milton Russell and Robert B. Shelton											47
Collective Consumption of Private Goods,											
Robert M. Spann											63
The Economics of Campaign Funds,											
William P. Welch											83
NOTES											
Is a Paretian Liberal Really Impossible?, Peter Bernholz											99
Provided The Control of the Control											
Potential Theft as Indirect Taxation: A Brief Note											
Richard J. Cebula and Paul K. Gatons						٠				*	109
The Cost of Internal Organization:											
A Suggested Simplification,											
Andrew J. Gold	•										113
REVIEW ARTICLES											
The Economic Theory of Representative Gover	rnı	me	nt	:							
A Review, Jean-Luc Migue											117
The Economic Theory of Representative Gover	eni	me	nt								
A Reply, Albert Breton											129
DOOK BRITISH											
BOOK REVIEWS	-		-			9					
Rapoport, Anatol. Two-Person Game Theory: Ideas and N-Person Game Theory: Conce	TI ep	he ts	Es	sen d A	pp	l lica	atio	ons	· ·		
											135
Melody, William. Children's TV: The Econom	ics	s o	f								
Exploitation. Reviewed by			-								
Richard M. Merelman									•		. 13
Niemi, Richard G. and Weisberg, Herbert F.,											
Editors. Probability Models of Collectiv	e										
Decision Making. Reviewed by Wilber A		Ch	afi	ee							. 14

SPRING, 1975 **VOLUME XXI** PAGE NUMBERS ARTICLES Voting Behavior, Efficiency, and Equity, Yoram Barzel and Robert T. Deacon . . . 15 Bureaucrats and Public Goods, Walter Hettich Viability, Preference, and Coalitions in the French Election 27 of 1951. Howard Rosenthal Competing for Aid, Gordon Tullock 53 The Logic of Bureaucratic Back Scratching, Robert E. Goodin 69 Progressive Tax Reform and Majority Voting, P. M. Pestieau On the Form of Special Interest Legislation, Paul H. Rubin 79 Notes Self-Generating Growth in Public Programs, Richard Craswell 91 A Comment on 'Democratic Theory: A Preliminary Mathematical Model', Bernard Grofman 99 Institutional Entropy, Barry Keating and Maryann Keating 105 Logrolling and the Arrow Paradox: A Note, Nicholas R. Miller Is a Paretian Liberal Really Impossible: A Reply, Amartya Sen A Comment on McCaleb's "The Size Principle and Collective-Consumption Payoffs to Political Coalitions, Richard J. Stolls, Leibenstein's Bandwagon Effect As Applied to Voting, Charles E. Zech Review Shaffer, William R. Computer Simulations of Voting Behavior. Reviewed by Jeffrey A. Smith

VOLUME XXII **SUMMER**, 1975 ARTICLES PAGE NUMBERS Candidate Support Functions in the 1968 Elections: An Empirical Application of the Spatial Model John H. Aldrich Income Distribution Under Majority Rule and Alternative Taxation Criteria 23 Voting Models Incorporating Interactions Between Voters Congressional Committee Assignments: An Optimization Model with Institutional Constraints Rational Choice, Light Guessing and the Gambler's Fallacy Rebecca S. Morrison and Peter C. Ordeshook Inessential Games and Non-Imposed Solutions to Allocation Problems Charles Bird Voting with Endogenous Preferences Social Choice Theory and Citizens' Intransitive Weak Preference: A Paradox Dennis I. Packard VOLUME XXIII FALL, 1975 ARTICLES PAGE NUMBERS Price Externalities Influence Public Policy Individual System Preference: A Model of Rational Choice

The Private Allocation of Public Funds				
G. Philpotts	٠			25
Pricing Public Goods: An Experiment With Two Proposed Pricing S	yste	ems		
Bruce A. Scherr and Emerson M. Babb			•	35
Experimenting with Public Goods Pricing: A Comment				
Edward H. Clarke			•	49
A Clear Test of Rational Voting Jeffrey W. Smith				55
Notes				
Is A Paretian Liberal Really Impossible: A Rejoinder Peter Bernholz				69
A Note on the Probability of a Tied Election				
Nathaniel Beck				75
The Possibility of Double-Peaked Preference Rankings for Pub Expenditures: Extension of the Barzel-Deacon Analysis	olic	Sch	ool	
Marilyn R. Flowers				81
The Probability of Intransitive Majority Rule: An Empirical Study Dean T. Jamison				87
Bureaucratic Profits, Migration Costs, and the Consolidation	of	L	ocal	
Government Dolores T. Martin and Richard B. McKenzie				95
The Rational Behavior Theory of Voter Participation: The Evi- Congressional Elections	deno	e f	rom	
Jonathan Silberman and Garey Durden				101
ROTC Service Commitments L. Joseph Thomas and Harold Bierman, Jr				109
Budgetary Cutbacks, Political Promises and the Unemployment Pr James H. Yeager, Jr	oble	m		115
Book Reviews				
Utopia, the Minimal State, and Entitlement James M. Buchanan				121
VOLUME XXIV	WI	NT	ER,	1975
ARTICLES	PA	GE	NUN	MBERS
Political Contribution and Policy - Some Extensions,				
Benjamin Bental and Uri Ben-Zion				1

VO	LI	IM	ES	ŝ

139 A Theory of Exchange, Philanthropy and Appropriation, 13 The Theory of Agency: The Policing "Paradox" and Regulatory 27 Information and Voting: An Empirical Note, 43 Bureaucratic Performance and Budgetary Reward, 51 Optimal City Size, the Economic Theory of Clubs and 59 The Collective Allocation of Commodities in a Democratic 71 Social Preference Ordering in a Probabilistic Voting 93 Vote Trading and Pareto Efficiency, 101 Notes A Note on Unconditional Probabilities and the Voter's XXV **SPRING**, 1976 ARTICLES PAGE NUMBERS The Impact of Decision Rules in Multi-Candidate Campaigns: The Case of the 1972 Democratic Presidential Nomination Voting Methods: A Simulation William G. Ludwin 19 Voter's Paradox and Logrolling: An Initial Framework for Committee Behavior on Appropriations and Ways and Means

Revenue Structure, Fiscal Illusion, and Budgetary Choice	
Richard E. Wagner	45
Notes	
11777	
Local Government Policies and Migration: Comment Robert Kohn	63
Local Government Policies and Migration: Reply and Extension	
Richard J. Cebula	65
A Comment on the Economics of Campaign Funds	
Jonathan Silberman	69
A Rejoinder to Silberman	
William P. Welch	75
Entropy and Size, A Clarification	
R. D. Auster	79
	11
Adam Smith on Public Choice	
James M. Buchanan	81
Endogenous Bandwagon and Underdog Effects in a Rational Choice Model	
Manfred Gartner	83
Book Reviews	
Head, John G. Public Goods and Public Welfare. Reviewed by	
Charles T. Clotfelter	91
Freeman, Roger A. The Growth of American Government: A Morphology of	
the Welfare State. Reviewed by	05
David G. Davies	95
Wilson, Edward O. Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. Reviewed by	
	.97
GOTAGN TANGER	
Tullock, Gordon, editor. Further Explorations in the Theory of Anarchy. Reviewed by	
David Friedman	101
ACTOR A LIGHTIMATE A TELEVISION AND A TE	101
McKenzie, R., and Staaf, R. J. An Economic Theory of Learning: Student	
Sovereignty and Academic Freedom. Reviewed by	
Mark Blaug	105

Buchanan, James M. The Limits of Liberty. Reviewed by R. L. Cunningham	109
VOLUME XXVI SUMMER, 19	76
ARTICLES PAGE NUMB	ERS
Condorcet's Paradox and Anonymous Preference Profiles, William V. Gehrlein and Peter C. Fishburn	1
The Voter's Paradox and the Homogeneity of Individual Preference Orders, R. Abrams	19
The Kernel and Payoffs in European Government Coalitions, Norman Schofield	29
Strategy - Proofness and Single Peakedness, Jean Marie Blin and Mark A. Satterthwaite	51
A Diagrammatic Exposition of the Logic of Collection Action, John R. Chamberlin	59
Further Results on Path Independence, Quasitransitivity, and Social Choice Robert R. Parks	75
Sequential Decision Making: A Model, Barbara Sinclair Deckard	89
Notes	
Global and Local Equilibrium in Majority Voting, Amoz Kats and Shmuel Nitzan	105
A Stochastic Model of the Committee Decision Process, P. M. Rice	107
Reply to Nicholas Miller: Logrolling and the Arrow Paradox: A Note, Peter Bernholz	117
	447
Howard Margolis	119
Natural Equilibrium in the Bush-Mayer Model of Anarchy: A Dynamic Analysis, Koji Okuguchi	129

A Measurement of Power in Voting Bodies: A Comment of Urken, Prafulla Joglekar	n K	ush	ine:	r ar		135
Some Further Comments on Modeling Power in Voting Bo Harvey Kushner and Arnold B. Urken	odie	es,				141
A Note on Clique Avoidance in Repeated Jury Selection F Fixed Pool of Jurors: Comparisons of Manpower Sa						
Twelve-Member Juries, Bernard Grofman and Scott						145
VOLUME XXVII				F	ALL	, 1976
ARTICLES			PAGE NUMB			MBERS
The American Experiment in Constitutional Choice,						
Vincent Ostrom	٠	*	•	٠	•	1
Comments on Vincent Ostrom's Paper, William Riker .						13
Response to William Riker's Comments, Vincent Ostrom						16
Locational Logrolling and Citizen Support of Municipal Bond Proposals: The Example of St. Louis,						21
J. Clark Archer and David R. Reynolds	•		٠	•		21
Identification of Preference for Election Outcomes from Aggregate Voting Data, Anthony J. Barkume						41
Public Sector Decision Making and the Technology of Consumption, Allan M. Maslove						59
The Effects of Industry Concentration and Regulation on Contributions in Three 1972 U.S. Senate Campaigns, Russell Pittman						71
		٠		•		,,
The Determinants of Voter Participation: A More General Model, Russell F. Settle and Burton A. Abrams						81
norams			•		•	01
Notes						
State Budget Sizes and the Marginal Productivity of Governors, W. Mark Crain and Robert D. Tollison						91
Collusion in Spatial Models of Party Competition,						97

VOLUMES

VOLUMES					143
The Electoral College and the Rational Vote,					
James B. Kau and Paul H. Rubin			•	•	101
ROTC Service Commitments: A Comment, Samuel					
Kleinman					109
ROTC Service Commitments: A Reply, Harold Bierman, Jr.					
and L. Joseph Thomas				•	113
Costs of Voting and Nonvoting, Richard G. Niemi					115
Turnout, Rational Abstention and Campaign Effort,					
Leslie Seidle and David Miller		٠			12:
Book Reviews					
Baumol, William J., and Oates, Wallace E. The Theory of					
Environmental Policy. Reviewed by Paul R. Portney			٠	•	127
Browning, Edgar K. Redistribution and the Welfare System.					
Reviewed by Alan Reynolds					129
McPheters, Lee R., and Stronge, William B., eds. The Econom					
and Law Enforcement. Reviewed by Gordon Tullock	•	0		*	131
O'Brien, David J. Neighborhood Organization and Interest					
Croup Processes Paviawed by Barry Vesting					122



